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Evaluating
Environmental
Degradation as a
Cause of Burma’s
Rohingya Crisis
HELENA S. LONG

Abstract
Over the course of the past decade,
persecution against the Rohingya ethnic
group in Western Burma has escalated to the
point of genocide. Since August 2017 alone,
more than 730,000 Rohingya have fled their
homes in Rakhine State to neighboring
Bangladesh1. Previous studies on the causes
of this crisis have focused on the colonial
legacy of discrimination toward ethnic and
religious minorities in Burma, themes of
identity and citizenship, and role of social
media in fueling the violence. Over, this
paper will consider what may be an
overlooked factor: the role of environmental
stress in inciting the conflict. After outlining
commonly understood causes of the crisis,
this paper seeks to evaluate the extent to
which environmental stress factored in by
(1) examining the status of environmental
degradation and natural disasters in Burma,
(2) considering how environmental pressure
may exacerbate violence against the
Rohingya, and (3) comparing this crisis to
ethnic conflict in Sudan, where
environmental stress was undoubtedly a
cause of violence. By establishing where
and how environmental stress played into
the Rohingya crisis, recommendations to
reduce the likelihood of environmental
factors inciting similar conflicts can be
made.

Published by DigitalCommons@Fairfield, 2021

Introduction
Over the course of the past decade,
persecution against the Rohingya ethnic
group in Western Burma has escalated to the
point of genocide, with the United Nations
Human Rights Council finding genocidal
intent in a 2019 factfinding mission2 and a
trial in the International Court of Justice
ongoing.3 Since August 2017 alone, more
than 730,000 Rohingya have fled their
homes in Rakhine State to neighboring
Bangladesh4. Previous analysis on the
causes of this crisis have focused on the
colonial legacy of discrimination toward
ethnic and religious minorities in Burma,5
themes of identity and citizenship,6
consequences of the 2011 democratic
opening including the emergence of
Buddhist extremist groups,7 and the
contribution of social media in escalating
violence.8 However, this paper considers
what may be an overlooked factor: the
impact of environmental stress. After
outlining historical context and the
commonly understood causes of the crisis,
this paper evaluates the extent to which
environmental stress played a causal role by
(1) examining the status of environmental
degradation and natural disasters in
Burma, (2) considering the relationship
between the environment and violence, and
(3) comparing this crisis to ethnic conflict in
Sudan, a frequently cited eco-conflict. After
establishing where and how environmental
stress is related to the Rohingya crisis,
policy recommendations for lessening this
factor’s role in Burma—as well as in other
conflict regions— are offered and assessed.

Background and Historical Context
Burma, also known as Myanmar, is a
country of approximately 55,600,000 people
located in Southeast Asia (see Figure 1for

1

Undergraduate Journal of Global Citizenship, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 2

map) with an extremely ethnically diverse
population; the most populous ethnic groups
are Burman (68%), Shan (9%), Karen (7%),
Rakhine (4%), Chinese (3%), Indian (2%),
and Mon (2%).9 For most of the region’s
history, various ethnic groups maintained
independent city-states and kingdoms, but in
the 19th century, Britain conquered Burma
and incorporated it as a province of the
Indian Empire.10 In 1937, Britain began
administering Burma as a separate, selfgoverning colony, and in 1948 it gained
independence.11

Figure 1: Map of Burma administrative
districts12
From independence until recently,
Burma has been governed by a series of
right-wing military and one-party regimes. 13
In 1989, following a year of violent unrest, a
new ruling junta changed the country’s
name from Burma to Myanmar, although
many countries including the United States
still do not recognize the name change due
to the illegitimacy of the government that
made the decision.14 In the 1990 election,
the National League for Democracy, a prodemocracy party led by Aung San Suu Kyi,
won a landslide victory, but the junta
refused to hand over power and Suu Kyi was
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placed under house arrest.15 In 1991, Suu
Kyi gained international recognition when
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize while still
under house arrest; in total, she would spend
15 of the next 21 years under house arrest
and was most recently detained in February
2021 during the country’s latest coup.16
Following the 1990 elections,
General Than Shwe became the paramount
ruler of the country for almost two decades
until the 2011 general elections, when the
military junta was officially dissolved.17 In
the wake of this democratic opening,
President Barack Obama became the first
U.S. president to visit Burma in 2012,
meeting with Suu Kyi, who had been
released from house arrest and elected to the
national legislature.18 President Obama
commended her as a champion of
democracy and human rights, thus launching
Burma’s progress into the international
spotlight.19 In 2015, the first credible
election in decades was held, with the NLD
emerging with an overwhelming victory and
Suu Kyi becoming the de facto head of
state.20
Reforms over the past decade were
marred by the continuing control of the
military (also known as the Tatmadaw) in
daily and political life and proven to be
short-lived in the aftermath of the latest
coup.21 The current Commander in Chief,
Min Aung Hlaing, was recommended for
investigation into crimes against humanity,
war crimes, and genocide by the UNHRC in
201922 and assumed all state power after
leading the Tatmadaw in arresting Suu Kyi
and other senior NLD leaders in February
2021.23
The 2019 investigation into Aung
Hlaing primarily regarded the intense
violence against the Rohingya people on the
western edge of Burma.24 The government
of Burma recognizes 135 “national races” in
Burma based on a list compiled in 1962.25
The Rohingya—all 2.5 million of them—are
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not one of these, constituting the world’s
largest stateless population, meaning they
are not citizens of any country.26 In fact,
most Burmese (including Suu Kyi) do not
even use the word “Rohingya,” rather, they
consider the group to be illegal immigrants
from Bangladesh.27 The exact origins of the
Rohingya are not known, but there is
evidence that this group has been present in
the region since the 13th century.28 The
Rohingya are not the only Muslims in
Burma—about 4% of the population is
Muslim, compared to more than two-thirds
who are Buddhist.29 However, Rohingya are
distinct from other Muslims in the country,
living in rural areas of the country’s Rakhine
State, speaking a dialect of Bengali, and
having Muslim rather than Burmese
names.30
There have long been divisions
between the Rohingya and other ethnic
groups in Burma. During WWII, the
Rohingya, along with the Karen and Kachin
minority groups, sided with the Allies and
engaged in guerilla warfare while the
Burmans sided with the Japanese.31
Following independence in 1948, the
Rohingya were gradually excluded from
state institutions. In 1974, the Rohingya
were labelled foreign citizens and mandated
to carry registration cards to distinguish
them from Burmans.32 The 1982 Citizenship
Law then effectively rendered the Rohingya
stateless by requiring all citizens to either
(1) be a member of the 135 national races,
(2) have a pending application under the
1948 Union Citizenship Act, or (3) have
conclusive evidence of residence in Burma
before independence.33 The political
upheaval around 1990 further worsened
conditions for the Rohingya: a campaign
against Muslims was seen as strengthening
the military government’s national
credentials among Buddhists.34 Nearly
300,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh in the
early 1990s, claiming the military forced
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them from their homes,35 and the Tatmadaw
restricted the population’s movement within
Rakhine state.36 In 1995, the UNHCR
pressured Burma into providing “Temporary
Registration Cards” to the Rohingya, but
violence continued past the turn of the
century with attacks on Muslim schools and
places of worship.37 In 2005, a two-child
policy was introduced in Rakhine State,
solely for the Rohingya population.38
Violence worsened after the
democratic opening of 2011.39 In June 2012,
the alleged rape and murder of a Rakhine
woman by three Muslim youths incited a
killing spree.40 The Rakhine are the largest
ethnic group in Rakhine state, and are
predominately Buddhist; in 2009, insurgents
formed the Arakan Army seeking selfdetermination for the Rakhine people,
adding another complicated dimension to
the conflict as the army clashes with both
the Tatmadaw and Rohingya.41 The violence
in 2012 between Rakhine and Rohingya
communities left at least 100 people dead
and left thousands of buildings including
homes, mosques, monasteries, and schools
burned down.42
2015 is generally considered the start
of the Rohingya refugee crisis, as increasing
“ghettoization, sporadic massacres, and
restrictions on movement” of the Rohingya
caused thousands to flee on rickety boats to
other Southeast Asian countries.43 In 2017,
the Tatmadaw began a “clearance
operation,” which included “extra judicial
killings, gang rapes, arson—all argued to
constitute genocide, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity.”44 Some 700,000
Rohingya fled Burma to refugee camps in
Bangladesh, leaving just about 200,000
Rohingya in Rakhine State by October
2018.45 In 2019, Burmese authorities
claimed the Rohingya could return, and
began operating “reception centers” near the
border, but these centers are often empty due
to the displaced people’s deep distrust that
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they will return to safe conditions.46
Findings from the 2019 UNHRC factfinding
mission found that although “clearance
operations” on the scale of 2017 ceased, “the
Rohingya remain the target of a Government
attack aimed at erasing the identity and
removing them from Myanmar...With
another year having passed without
improvements to their dire living conditions,
prospects for accountability or legal
recognition as citizens of Myanmar, their
plight can only be considered as having
deteriorated.”47

investigated the Tatmadaw for violence
against groups including the Shan, Kachin,
Karen, and Chin53 (see Figure 2).
Figure 2: Image by Author In 2018, I briefly visited the
city of Tachileik in Burma’s Shan State while studying abroad in
Thailand. The Shan battle for independence is another example of

Established Causes of the Conflict
Most existing scholarship on the causes of
the Rohingya crisis focuses on the long
history of ethnic conflict and discrimination
in Burma. Jobair Alam argues that this
discrimination is rooted in the British
colonial era, stating that before the arrival of
the British, “the different groups that make
up the complex ethnic tapestry of Burma
were never under the authority of a single
government.”48 The British era created the
majority-minority divide and deep
nationalism tied to Buddhist identity that
exists to this day.49 After independence,
discrimination was solidified into laws such
as the 1982 Citizenship Law which rendered
the Rohingya stateless and deprived them of
access to education, health services, and
employment.50 This stripping of citizenship
“largely (re)shaped the identity of the
Rohingya in Myanmar as a non-Burman
Muslim religious minority,” compared to
minorities who “strictly comply with and fit
absolutely in the Burmese-constructed
ideals, belief and identity.”51 Even
disregarding acts of violence against the
Rohingya, their rejection from the state has
led to restrictions on travel, marriage,
birthing rates, and freedom of religion.52 The
Rohingya are not the only minority group to
face discrimination in Burma; the UN has
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ethnic conflict in Burma.

However, while there are multiple
ethnic conflicts ongoing in Burma, the
campaign against the Rohingya has been the
most systematic.54 A 1988 regime document
recently uncovered by the International State
Crime Institute exposed a long term plan for
eradication of the Rohingya, with steps
including forbidding land ownership and
finding the Rohingya at fault in all court
cases—but avoiding mass killing “in order
not to invite the attention of the Muslim
countries.”55 This document embodies one
of the main established causes of the current
crisis: discrimination against the Rohingya
is deeply rooted in laws and practices under
the military regime, and the Tatmadaw has
simply been waiting for an excuse “to totally
wipe them out from Rakhine.”56 The extent
to which the ethnic conflict is civilian as
well as military based is debated; for
example, there is deep animosity between
Rakhine and Rohingya locals, but at least
part of this resentment may be attributed to
manipulation by the Tatmadaw in turning
the groups against each other.57
Beyond ethnic discrimination,
religious discrimination is pertinent to this
crisis. Islamophobia is common among
many Burmese Buddhists, and Rakhine
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state’s location bordering Muslim
Bangladesh makes some consider it the
“‘western gate’... the last line of defence
protecting the pure, Theravadda Buddhism”
of Burma from Islam.58 Some Buddhists
hold the view that, “If the gate breaks, the
tens of millions of Muslims from Bengal
will overrun not only Myanmar but also
mainland Southeast Asia, much as is
narrated to have occurred centuries ago in
island Southeast Asia.”59
Nobody disputes that a long history
of ethnic and religious discrimination
against the Rohingya underlies the latest
violent campaign against them. What is less
certain however, is the specific events that
triggered the unprecedented bloodshed of
the past decade. Waves of violence have hit
Rakhine State before, but recent years are
distinct in their display of “undeterred
propagation of hate speech coupled with
clear political coordination.”60 One theory is
that the democratic reopening triggered the
violence. The most recent Constitution,
written in 2008, “is notable for the degree to
which it has not only conjoined the state and
national races lexically but also
institutionally.”61 The Constitution
emphasized the idea of “taingyintha,” or
“national races” of Burma, and suggested
that belonging to one of the recognized races
was of even greater importance than
citizenship.62 The Constitution frames
taingyintha as creating a “mythic unity that
has never emerged and could be read as a
defiant repudiation of ethnic diversity.”63
In addition to constitutional changes,
when the military junta lifted limits on free
expression and assembly in 2011, it allowed
for a wave of populist mobilization where
“deep, pent-up societal division and hatred,
which was repressed by authoritarian rule”
was unleashed by the democratization
process.64 Two Buddhist extremist groups
emerged in the aftermath of the 2011
transition: the “969 Movement” and “Ma-
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Ba-Tha,” both of which have been tolerated
and even promoted by the government.65
Many westerners consider Buddhism a
pacifist religion; however, certain monks are
at the forefront of the violence. For example,
U Wirathu, the monk leader of the 969
movement, was called the “Face of Buddhist
Terror” by Time magazine in 2013.66 These
extremist groups successfully campaigned
the government to revoke the Rohingya’s
temporary registration certificates in 2015
and have spewed hate speech, including
calling Islam “a faith of animals with
uncontrollable birthrates."67 Additionally,
fearmongering and discrimination have
become campaign tools in the era of
democracy, and both “hardliners and socalled reformists find incentives in being
complicit in the anti-Muslim conflicts.”68
Thus, while democratic developments in
Burma over the past decade promised
reform from the years of junta control, they
may in fact have helped incite the conflict in
Rakhine State by releasing “hard-core and
deeply felt grievances about Buddhism
being under siege from the forces of
modernity, globalism and Islam.”69
A final factor commonly cited as
amplifying the violence is the use of social
media in Burma. In Burma, Facebook is so
widely used by the country’s 18 million
internet users that it is often equated with the
internet itself.70 In 2018, a New York Times
investigation revealed that not only were
extremist groups using Facebook to disperse
hate speech, but the military itself was
behind turning “the social network into a
tool for ethnic cleansing.”71 Military
personnel created fake accounts and flooded
them with hate speech, including posting
pictures of corpses they said were evidence
of massacres by the Rohingya, and stated
that Muslim attacks were imminent.72
Facebook took down accounts after the
investigation revealed ties to the military but
received criticism for its response and
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commitment to preventing similar situations
in the future.73 The internet provides a
means of propaganda beyond anything in the
past, and the systematic use of it by
extremists and the military to instigate
violence contributed to the crisis’ outbreak
and intensity.

Environmental Factors in Burma
With an understanding of the prevailing
causal theories, environmental factors in
Burma can be discussed. The environment
has long been studied as a “threat
multiplier” for existing conflicts.74 Thomas
F. Homer-Dixon writes that environmental
scarcity “can contribute to civil violence,
including insurgencies and ethnic clashes.”75
However, its role is rarely direct, rather
interacting with other factors to produce
violence, and therefore analysts often
overlook scarcity’s role in flaring underlying
stress and instead interpret economic, social,
or political factors as the principal cause.76
An example of interaction between social
and environmental factors is “resource
capture,” when dominant groups within a
society “shift resource distribution in their
favor.” 77 Moreover, environmental scarcity
may strengthen group identities based on
ethnic, class, or religious affiliations in a
process known as social segmentation, as
groups face intensified competitive for
resources.78
While the role of resource scarcity in
conflict is far from new, climate change,
population growth, and economic
development are expected to increase the
prevalence of these circumstances.79
Through catastrophic weather events,
climate change, “will lead to new or more
intense resource scarcities, which, in turn,
will trigger more intense competition and
conflict between states and local
communities sharing common resources.”80

https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/jogc/vol4/iss1/2

This existing framework for the role
of environmental scarcity and natural
disasters in fueling conflict evokes the
situation in Burma, which faces an
increasingly vulnerable environmental state.
A 2019 World Bank report concluded that
Burma’s ecosystems, fisheries, and forestry
are under “tremendous pressure.”81 Burma’s
marine fish resources have declined as much
as 90 percent since 1980, forest cover has
declined by 10 million hectares since 1990,
and urban waste, mining discharge, and air
quality are all deteriorating as well.82
As Burma relies heavily on natural
resource exploitation for economic
development, environmental degradation
affects not only the natural world and human
health, but economic prosperity. Seventy
percent of the labor force is employed in
agriculture, accounting for 37.8 percent of
GDP.83 The government has prioritized
short-term profit over long-term
sustainability, with slash-and-burn and
industrial agriculture methods promoted.84
Burma’s policies hostile to sustainable
changes “can force the cultivation systems
into suboptimal practices … or obstruct
them altogether, leading to poverty and
conflict, alienating cultivators and leading to
degraded land.” 85 Climate change will
compound this threat, with the FAO finding
that Burma is “highly vulnerable to climate
change and extreme weather conditions,”
with significant risk for agricultural
production and food insecurity. 86 The FAO
and World Bank call for sustainable policy
approaches to prevent a worse-case scenario.
Unfortunately, a different kind of
worse-case scenario is already facing
Rakhine State. Rakhine State is one of the
most resource-rich parts of the country,
despite being one of the poorest
economically.87 However, recent efforts aim
to tap into the region’s potential. For
example, between 2000 and 2014, Rakhine
state lost more mangrove forest cover than
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any other state in Burma, causing an
estimated ecosystem value loss of $946.87
million per year due to damages to fisheries
and habitat.88 When resource-rich Rakhine
state is contrasted to conditions in Burma’s
central states, where the populous regions of
Mandalay, Magway, and Sagaing display
existing land degradation due to problems
with erosion, desertification, salinization,
and deforestation,89 the question is raised:
does the recent exploitation of Rakhine
state’s resources constitute a “resource
capture” scenario as conditions deteriorate
in primarily Burman states?
Burma’s “Agenda 21” plan for
sustainable development, a document
submitted to the U.N., even hints at this
intention. In it, programs for “the
development of border areas and national
races” and reclaiming “cultivable
wastelands” are described.90 This reference
to taingyintha is alarming within a
sustainable development plan, and the plan
may be coming to fruition. In the midst of
the Rohingya crisis, the government
announced that Rakhine state would be
transformed into a business hub, and
countries including Japan and Korea have
already invested in the state.91 A.K.M Ahsan
Ullah and Diotima Chattoraj claim that to
implement this development plan, “the
government needed to wipe out Rohingya
from their homeland.”
New York Times reporters in Rakhine
state in 2019 witnessed this development in
action.92 The reporters noted “infrastructure
development in Rakhine: new power
stations, government buildings and, most of
all, military and border guard bases ... built
on land emptied by ethnic cleansing,” and
found that Buddhists had taken over
Rohingya businesses, that the military
continues to raze Muslim villages, and that
the companies responsible for the building
boom were “cronies of the military.” 93
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Rakhine state is not the only ethnic
minority state in Burma where resources
have been seized by the Tatmadaw. For
example, in Kachin state, “resource
extraction has provided incentive and
financing” for the Tatmadaw and the Kachin
Independence Organization (KIO) to keep
fighting in a state rich with precious stones
and minerals.94 In Karen state, the
Tatmadaw has used “intimidation and
coercion to seize land and displace local
people” in an area that is appealing for
tourism, extractive, and agriculture
industries.95
If the Tatmadaw are similarly
pursuing resource gains in Rakhine state,
who stands to benefit? While the
government was known to enlist “Rakhine
Buddhist fundamentalists to safeguard their
interests in the resource-rich state,”96 the
Tatmadaw’s own ongoing conflict with the
Arakan Army calls to attention that in other
ethnic regions facing conflict in Burma,
“armed groups have often been manipulated
against each other, weakening their military
capabilities, and often causing them to lose
control of their natural resources.”97 This
raises the possibility that both ethnic
minorities, Rohingya and Rakhine, could be
excluded from any Tatmadaw development
plan in favor of enriching the military’s own
pockets or benefitting solely the Burman
majority.
In addition to this development plan,
specific environmental events may have
fueled the crisis; in particular, the aftermath
of Cyclone Nargis had secondary effects on
the Rakhine region. On May 2, 2008,
Cyclone Nargis struck Burma’s Irrawaddy
Delta, located primarily in Ayeyarwady
Region bordering Rakhine State.98
Approximately 140,000 people were killed,
making it the worst natural disaster in
Burmese history.99 The cyclone additionally
destroyed much of Burma’s rice crop, as the
Irrawaddy Delta was one of the primary
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regions of production, and saline water from
storm surge contaminated about one million
acres of cropland.100 This caused severe
food shortages and high prices, with one
analyst predicting that due to “the historical
connection between rice shortages and
popular unrest … the cycle of explosive
protest and regime crackdowns is likely to
continue.”101 While Cyclone Nargis is the
most severe example, other natural disasters
such as 2010’s Cyclone Giri and 2017’s
Cyclone Mora also worsened conditions.
Cyclone Giri destroyed an estimated 97, 125
hectares of farmland in Rakhine State,102
and Cyclone Mora—which hit the region
after the refugee crisis began—tore through
refugee camps. These natural disasters likely
had a destabilizing effect on the region and
intensified competition for resources.
The evidence in Burma of
environmental scarcity, resource capture in
ethnic regions, and devastating natural
disasters aligns with the existing framework
for how environmental stress may fuel
violence, particularly as a threat multiplier
on top of deep-rooted social and political
elements. To further explore this claim, this
crisis can be compared to another where
environmental factors are frequently cited as
playing a role: Sudan.

Comparative Case Study: Sudan
While the decades-long conflict in Sudan
(and now South Sudan) began as an ethnoreligious civil war between the
predominantly Arab Muslim north and the
African Christian south, the war has grown
in layers of complexity over the years, and
now environmental factors including
drought and desertification are commonly
recognized as exacerbating the violence.103
Sudan gained independence from Britain in
1956, and like many other postcolonial
states, Sudan was left with few routes to
economic development beyond its natural

https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/jogc/vol4/iss1/2

resources.104 An overconcentration of people
in central Sudan led to severe degradation
and overexploitation of the region,
contributing “to intensifying ethnic
hostilities and competition for limited
resources.”105 Additionally, this motivated
the northern-based government to drive
southward to extract natural resources,
jeopardizing the livelihoods of southern
citizens and contributing to the formation of
the Sudan People’s Liberation Army in
present-day South Sudan.106 While violence
in Sudan is still best characterized as an
ethno-religious conflict, “eco-conflicts have
clearly protracted the Sudanese war” as
advantaged groups monopolize resources at
the expense of the majority, resulting “in
environmental destruction, economic
decline, social disintegration, population
displacement, and protracted conflict.107
How well does Sudan’s situation
align with Burma’s? In both cases (see
Figure 3 for a comparative flowchart) a
former British colony with extreme ethnic
and religious diversity was left with few
tools for survival beyond natural resource
use. For both countries, this led to
overexploitation of resources in the
central/majority-group-controlled regions,
causing a drive for development in minority
regions. Finally, in Sudan and Burma, these
drives for development were followed by
waves of intense violence within a longer
history of conflict. However, there are some
differences. For one, environmental pressure
in Sudan is more severe, with a 2007 U.N.
Environmental Programme report declaring
that the scale of climate change was “almost
unprecedented: the reduction in rainfall has
turned millions of hectares of already
marginal semi-desert grazing land into
desert.”108 In comparison, Burma is in “a
region less vulnerable to desertification,”
although aforementioned issues including
soil erosion, salinization, soil fertility
depletion, and alkalinization affect about 17

8

Long: Environmental Degradation as a Cause of Burma’s Rohingya Crisis

percent of the country, primarily in the
central regions.109 Another difference
between Sudan and Burma is the presence of
climate migration. In Sudan, drought,
desertification, and flooding are direct
causes of migration and internal
displacement, as these issues force people to
seek more arable land.110 In Burma, there is
little evidence that environmental factors
directly cause IDPs and climate refugees,
but environmental pressure may intensify
the conflicts that produce refugees. Finally,
the role of natural disasters is different in
these two countries: Burma is vulnerable to
unpredictable, one-time events such as
cyclones, earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic
eruptions, and landslides, whereas Sudan is
more vulnerable to long-term events such as
droughts.

Figure 3: Infographic by Author
The case of Sudan helps exemplify
how the Rohingya crisis fits the framework
of a conflict with environmental layers, even
if degradation in Burma is less severe than
Sudan. While there is limited prior research
on the role of environmental pressure in
Burmese conflicts, there are clear
similarities between Burma and Sudan
where more scholarship on eco-conflict
exists, thus displaying how a combination of
ethnic tensions, unequal distribution of
power, and resource scarcity fuels violence.
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Environmental Impacts of the Crisis
Not only have environmental problems in
Burma seemingly contributed to the past
decade’s flare-up of violence against the
Rohingya, but the crisis itself has impacted
the environment. As of August 2019, more
than 730,000 Rohingya refugees are living
in the world’s largest refugee encampment
in Bangladesh, a “teeming, squalid
settlement” where landslides, rampaging
elephants, and disease are common.111
These camps put tremendous pressure on
local ecosystems. About 4,300 acres of hills
and forests were cut down to make shelters
and to use as cooking fuel, and every month
an additional nearly 6,800 tons of firewood
are collected.112 This deforestation causes
biodiversity loss and increases the risk of
landslides.113 Additionally, air quality is
declining as a result of increased vehicular
traffic and smoke from cooking fires, and
there are no long-term solutions for waste
management including fecal matter and
plastics.114 This has resulted in the
contamination of already-limited water
resources, with about 70 percent of
groundwater samples in a 2017 study found
to be heavily polluted.115 The poor
environmental outlook for areas around the
camps not only negatively impacts
ecosystems and creates even worse
conditions for the already suffering
Rohingya, but risks additional conflict. A
summary of physical impacts of the camps
in a U.N. Development Programme report
concluded that, “In particular the impacts on
groundwater may give rise to significant
social conflicts between the host
communities and Rohingya over the use of
water resources.”116
Analysis of Causes
Few, if any, conflicts are one-dimensional.
Conflicts consist of “numerous root causes
interacting or stimulating each other and
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finally escalating into the explosion …
conflict is a process, not a fixed state of
crisis.”117 In the case of Burma, the root
causes of the Rohingya crisis are ethnic
discrimination stemming from the British
colonial era and religious discrimination
intensified by the civilization “fault line”
between Burma and Bangladesh. These root
causes have resulted in systematic exclusion
of the Rohingya from Burmese society, with
a system of laws and policies denying them
citizenship and basic rights. With this long
history of exclusion, what factors incited the
recent phase of violence, which peaked in
2017? While prior scholarship primarily
cites societal changes caused by the 2011
democratic opening, the emergence of new
Buddhist extremist groups, and propaganda
efforts made possible by social media,
increasing environmental pressure in Burma
should be considered a factor as well.
In Burma, overreliance on natural
resources, unsustainable government
policies, and natural disasters including the
devastating Cyclone Nargis have contributed
to a situation of environmental stress, with
the country’s ecosystems, fisheries, and
forestry coming under tremendous
pressure.118 One sign of this stress is land
degradation in the populous central regions,
and there is evidence that the Tatmadaw’s
solution to securing resources (whether to
fund its own operations or for the majority
ethnic and religious groups) is to exploit
resource-rich ethnic minority states. For
instance, Burma’s Agenda 21 plan lists
development of border areas and national
races as a sustainable development
program,119 and resource capture is evident
within conflicts in both Karen120 and Kachin
States.121 That a similar seizure—rather than
pure ethnic conflict—is unfolding in
Rakhine state is evidenced by a recent
harvesting push in the region for resources
such as mangroves and an announcement by
the government after the “clearance
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operations” of 2017 that Rakhine State
would be transformed into a business hub.122
This infrastructure development on land
cleared by ethnic cleansing, with Buddhists
moving in where the Rohingya were killed
or forced out, has been witnessed by
reporters in the region.123
Therefore, while violence against the
Rohingya is mired in deep ethnic and
religious division, codified in discriminatory
policies, and has been foreshadowed for
decades—most explicitly by a regime
document with a long-term eradication plan
for the Rohingya—environmental scarcity in
Burma fits the framework for eco-conflicts
as an “aggravating cause in a highly
complex, multicausal system.”124 The
environmental layer likely not only interacts
with the long-term causes of the crisis, but
also with other inciting factors. For example,
Homer-Dixon’s social segmentation process
of heightened group identity in the face of
resource competition may partially explain
the emergence of players within the conflict
such as Buddhist extremist groups or the
Arakan army. Additionally, in the wake of
the democratic opening, the Tatmadaw may
have sought ways to strengthen itself after
losing junta control, with lucrative foreign
contracts for infrastructure development in
ethnic regions a possible solution. And
further, the Rohingya crisis’ own
environmental impacts including degraded
land, water, and air in areas around the
refugee camps risk a circular effect of
starting new conflict with the host
community. These are examples of the ways
in which environmental factors may weave
throughout a conflict to inspire new points
of tension or exacerbate existing ones.
While “because the relationship between
environmental scarcity and contextual
factors is interactive, it is often impossible to
determine the relative weight or power of
environmental scarcity as a cause of
violence in specific cases,” the evidence in
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Burma leads to the conclusion that
environmental factors must be considered
within the dimensions of the Rohingya
crisis.
Recommendations
The Rohingya crisis is often called a
hopeless one. While in April 2018, Burma
agreed to begin “voluntary and dignified
repatriations,” almost no Rohingya have
returned.125 The Rohingya are terrified to
return to the site of mass killings, and
Burmese officials still fail to even recognize
them as a distinct ethnic group, much less
citizens.126 The September 2019 UNHRC
factfinding mission on Burma found that
there is a serious risk of genocidal actions
recurring, and that it is impossible for the
Rohingya to return in current conditions.127
Meanwhile, the Bangladeshi government,
struggling with overpopulation and poverty,
is under pressure from its citizens to ensure
that funds are not diverted to refugees, who
have not been given official refugee status to
ensure their placement is not permanent.128
General recommendations for
addressing this conflict include repealing the
1982 Citizenship Law and offering an
accessible path to citizenship for the
Rohingya.129 Additionally, Burma should
close its internal camps housing Rohingya
and provide them with adequate land and
freedom of movement.130 The UNHRC does
not recommend returning refugees located in
Bangladesh to Burma until adequate
provisions for their protection exist.131
International acts such as prosecuting Burma
for crimes against humanity, severing
relations between the international
community and the Tatmadaw, and
instituting sanctions to prevent the flow of
arms and other military equipment into the
country may pressure the government into
action. The UN factfinding mission on
Myanmar listed 14 known international
suppliers of arms to Burma, which included
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companies based in China, Russia, India,
and Singapore (see figure 4 for a chart of
suppliers132). However, the practical
limitations of these recommendations must
be acknowledged, particularly in light of the
February 2021 coup when the Tatmadaw
regained control of the government. Despite
being alienated from much of the global
community and with genocide proceedings
ongoing in the International Court of Justice,
the Tatmadaw has only doubled down on
suppression—not just for ethnic minorities,
but all opposition.133 In a country where
officials still claim “‘Rohingya’ is not
real,”134 a better future within Burma’s
borders for the Rohingya seems far from
reality.

Figure 4: Infographic on arms and military
equipment suppliers to Burma
Recommendations specific to
environmental causes begin with addressing
the underlying degradation. As HomerDixon writes, “if severe environmental
damage becomes irreversible, it can become
a permanent source of social stress; even if
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the political and economic factors that
originally produced the damage are
fixed.”135 Between continued
overexploitation of resources, population
growth, and the accelerating threat of
climate change, Burma must take action
now to prevent permanent harm to the land
and resources its people depend upon for
survival. Actions such as restoring
productivity to land through sustainable
agriculture methods, diversifying crops,
combating illegal logging and poaching, and
improving urban conditions through waste
management and air pollution projects can
help improve Burma’s environmental status.
Additionally, Burma should move away
from a largely natural resource-based
economy as outlined in the country’s
Sustainable Development Plan. However,
development projects must benefit all
residents; specifically in Rakhine state,
development programs “should take the
necessary steps to ensure that their actions,
first, do not enrich the Tatmadaw and,
second, are of benefit to all the ethnic
communities of Rakhine State on the basis
of equality.”136 By addressing underlying
environmental degradation, curbing climate
change, and developing sustainably and
inclusively, environmental issues could
move far down the long list of factors
causing conflict in Burma. Additionally, to
prevent the degradation caused by refugee
camps from perhaps fueling more violence,
international aid should be directed to
refugees to supply resources such as
alternative fuel options and safe drinking
water. Whether in a Bangladeshi camp or in
the central regions of Burma, unmitigated
deterioration of environmental conditions
can only be expected to increase tensions in
the region, possibly leading to further social
segmentation, resource capture, and
violence.
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Conclusion
In this paper, environmental degradation in
Burma has been examined as a factor in the
ongoing Rohingya crisis. While the root
causes of this conflict are long-term and
systematic ethnic and religious
discrimination, Burma’s declining
environmental status should be considered
alongside the fallout of the 2011 democratic
opening, a wave of Buddhist extremism, and
propaganda spread through social media as
an inciting factor. Limited prior research
exists on the Rohingya crisis as an ecoconflict; however, through examining the
location and extent of degradation and
natural disasters in Burma, the government’s
stated plans for development, and the
current situation in Rakhine State, a portrait
of the environmental layers of the crisis can
be painted. Additionally, the situation in
Burma can be placed within the existing
framework for the role of environmental
scarcity in ethno-religious conflicts, with the
Tatmadaw’s actions in ethnic regions of
Burma aligning with the concept of resource
capture and showing how competition may
contribute to social segmentation. Finally, a
comparative case-study to conflict in Sudan
sheds light on how while “environmental
stress results in violent conflict only when
interacting with other political, ethnic,
economic, and social causes,”137 (Lee,
1997), in both Burma and Sudan, resource
scarcity and inequality led to worsening
violence along existing fault lines. With few
signs that Burma will soon turn to more
sustainable resource use, and with climate
change certain to aggravate natural disasters
and land quality issues, action needs to be
taken now to prevent the intensification of
conflict in an already conflict-ridden
country. The situation of the Rohingya in
Burma provides further warning for other
countries facing upheaval in how
environmental stress may lace itself through
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fracture points—a warning that must be
heeded as environmental threats accelerate
and intensify worldwide.
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